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ADMISSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES
EVIDENCE IN DIVERSITY ACTIONS BASED ON
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 (Rule 407)' represents a policy decision
to promote post-accident repairs2 by excluding evidence of subsequent
remedial measures3 when offered to prove negligence or culpable con-
duct.4 To a lesser extent,5 the rule is premised on the procedural judg-
1. Fed. R. Evid. 407 provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is
not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the
event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent meas-
ures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or
feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
For a general discussion, see 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence §§ 163.165
(1978); C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 275 (3d ed. 1984); 2 J. Weinstein &
M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 407[01]-[02] (1982); 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials
at Common Law § 283 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
2. Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee note; see Moe v. Avions Dassault-Breguet
Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 176 (1984); Lolie v. Ohio
Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1974); Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal.
3d 113, 119, 528 P.2d 1148, 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (1975) (en bane); C. McCor-
mick, supra note 1, § 275, at 815; 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, ' 407[01], at
407-7; J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 283, at 174-75; cf. 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra
note 1, § 164, at 241 ('[T]here may well be another, largely unstated, policy basis behind
the Rule. It appears unseemly, and it may even be unfair, to allow, as evidence offered
against a person over his objection, proof that he reacted sensibly and constructively to
the fact that an accident occured.").
3. "Subsequent remedial measures" include any actions, "which, if taken previously,
would have made the [accident] less likely to occur." Fed. R. Evid. 407; see, eg, Colum-
bia & P.S.R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 203, 208 (1892) (installation of safety de-
vices); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716 F.2d 1322, 1324-25 (10th Cir. 1983)
(modification of equipment), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 2170 (1984); DeLuryea v. Winthrop
Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 227-28 (8th Cir. 1983) (change in package insert); SEC v.
Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 52 (2d Cir. 1976) (change in regulations); Smyth v. Upjohn
Co., 529 F.2d 803, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1975) (change in warning); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.
American Cyanamid Co., 321 F.2d 683, 691 (5th Cir. 1963) (recommendation to abate
nuisance); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310, 315-16 (9th Cir. 1961) (change
in design); Steele v. Wiedemann Mach. Co., 280 F.2d 380, 382 (3d Cir. 1960) (purchase
order of equipment for subsequent repairs); Limbeck v. Interstate Power Co., 69 F.2d
249, 252 (8th Cir. 1934) (change in construction); Armour & Co. v. Skene, 153 F. 241,
244-45 (1st Cir.) (dismissal of employee), cert. denied, 206 U.S. 562 (1907).
4. Rule 407 does not bar subsequent remedial measures evidence when offered for a
purpose other than proving negligence or culpable conduct if the other purpose is contro-
verted. See Fed. R. Evid. 407. Subsequent remedial measures evidence has been admit-
ted as proof of defendant's ownership or control of the premises, duty to repair,
possibility or feasibility of precautionary measures, and of facts contradicting those testi-
fied to by the adversary's witness. See C. McCormick, supra note 1, § 275, at 816-17.
Subsequent remedial measures made by a third party are admissible against a defend-
ant. See Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 528 n.20 (8th Cir. 1977) (exclusionary
policy does not apply when subsequent repairs made by third persons); Lolie v. Ohio
Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1974) (same). Evidence of subsequent remedial
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ment that such evidence is substantially more confusing to the jury than
it is relevant in determining whether negligence or culpable conduct ex-
ists. 6 Similar or identical rules are in effect in every state7 except Maine.8
Although these rules apply in negligence actions,9 state courts disagree as
to whether application in strict products liability'" furthers the underly-
measures made by one defendant has been held admissible against another defendant. See
Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1969) (policy of
encouraging repairs does not apply when evidence is admitted against another
defendant).
5. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 472 (7th Cir. 1984); D.L. by
Friederichs v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 605, 329 N.W.2d 890, 901 (1983); 2 D. Louisell
& C. Mueller, supra note 1, § 164, at 239; see Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee note
("The conduct is not in fact an admission .... The other, and more impressive, ground
for exclusion rests on a social policy .... ).
6. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee note; R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A
Modem Approach to Evidence 192 (2d ed. 1982).
7. Thirty states have formally enacted such rules. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-1001
(Rule 407) (1979); Cal. Evid. Code § 1151 (West 1966); Fla. Stat. § 90.407 (1978); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 60-451 (1983); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-407 (1979); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 48,095
(1979); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2407 (West 1980); Or. Rev. Stat. § 40.185 (Rule 407)
(1981); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 19-12-9 (1979); Va. Code § 8.01-418.1 (Supp. 1984);
Alaska R. Evid. 407; Ariz. R. Evid. 407; Colo. R. Evid. 407; Del. Unif. R. Evid. 407;
Hawaii R. Evid. 407; Iowa R. Evid. 407; Mich. R. Evid. 407; Minn. R. Evid. 407; Mont.
R. Evid. 407; N.J. R. Evid. 51; N.M. R. Evid. 407; N.C. R. Evid. 407; N.D. R. Evid. 407;
Ohio R. Evid. 407; Tex. R. Evid. 407; Utah R. Evid. 51; Vt. R. Evid. 407; Wash. R.
Evid. 407; Wis. R. Evid. 904.07; Wyo. R. Evid. 407.
The other states apply the common law. See, e.g., Fine v. Giant Food Stores, Inc., 163
F. Supp. 231, 236 (D.D.C. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 269 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
Dixie Elec. Co. v. Maggio, 294 Ala. 411, 415, 318 So.2d 274, 277 (1975); Shegda v.
Hartford-Conn. Trust Co., 131 Conn. 186, 188, 38 A.2d 668, 669 (1944); Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Sellars, 89 Ga. App. 293, 297, 79 S.E.2d 35, 39 (1953); Alsup v. Saratoga
Hotel, 71 Idaho 229, 236-37, 229 P.2d 985, 990 (1951); Kyowski v. Bums, 70 111. App. 3d
1009, 1016, 388 N.E.2d 770, 775 (1979); Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co. v. Armuth, 180
Ind. 673, 685-86, 103 N.E. 738, 742-43 (1913); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Jenkins, 312
Ky. 470, 474, 227 S.W.2d 906, 909 (1950); Armstrong v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
423 So. 2d 79, 82 (La. App. 1982); Long v. Joestlein, 193 Md. 211, 220, 66 A.2d 407, 411
(1949); National Laundry Co. v. City of Newton, 300 Mass. 126, 127, 14 N.E.2d 108, 109
(1938); Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Carter, 209 Miss. 71, 77-78, 45 So. 2d 854, 855
(1950); Steoppelman v. Hays-Fendler Constr. Co., 437 S.W.2d 143, 152 (Mo. Ct. App.
1968); Panagoulis v. Philip Morris & Co., 95 N.H. 524, 525, 68 A.2d 672, 673-74 (1949);
Danielson v. City of New York, 283 A.D. 1019, 1019, 131 N.Y.S.2d 136, 138 (1954) (per
curiam); Pressler v. City of Pittsburgh, 419 Pa. 440, 443-44, 214 A.2d 616, 618-19 (1965);
McGarr v. National & Providence Worsted Mills, 24 R.I. 447, 457, 53 A.320, 324 (1902);
Maus v. Pickens Sentinel Co., 258 S.C. 6, 12, 186 S.E.2d 809, 811 (1972); Belote v. Mem-
phis Dev. Co., 51 Tenn. App. 423, 369 S.W.2d 97, 106 (1962); Redman v. Community
Hotel Corp., 138 W. Va. 456, 469-70, 76 S.E.2d 759, 766 (1953).
8. Me. R. Evid. 407 provides: "When, after an event, measures are taken which, if
taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subse-
quent measures is admissible." The Maine legislature found Federal Rule 407's policy
rationale unpersuasive and therefore decided to admit subsequent remedial measures evi-
dence unless exclusion under Rule 403 is proper. See Me. R. Evid. 407 advisers' note,
quoted in 2 Wigmore, supra note 1, § 283, at 183.
9. But see supra note 7.
10. To establish strict liability in tort, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant mar-
keted a defective-unreasonably dangerous-product. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R.
Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
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ing social policy.11
cited as Prosser & Keeton]. A product can be unreasonably dangerous due to a manufac-
turing defect, design defect or the manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings
for use of a product. See id
A manufacturing defect exists when a product leaves a defendant's possession in an
obviously flawed or unintended condition. This action bears no resemblance to negli-
gence because the condition of the product, not the defendant's conduct, is at issue. See
id.
Depending on the jurisdiction, a plaintiff, in order to prove a design defect, must show
either that the product is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contem-
plated by the ordinary consumer," id. at 698, or that "the magnitude of the danger out-
weighs the utility of the product," id. at 699. Although the inquiry focuses on the
condition of the product, the defendant's conduct is at issue in much the same way as it is
in negligence actions because a variation of the reasonable person standard is applied.
See id. But see infra note 70 and accompanying text.
When a defendant fails to adequately warn users of a risk related to the product, the
inquiry is almost identical to that in negligence because the plaintiff must prove that "the
defendant designer knew or should have known in the exercise of ordinary care of the risk
or hazard about which he failed to warn." Id. at 697.
Courts typically determine whether subsequent remedial measures are admissible in
strict products liability without distinguishing the three theories. The Eighth Circuit,
however, admits evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict products liability, see
Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1980), unless the action is based on
the manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings, see DeLuryea v. Winthrop Lab-
oratories, 697 F.2d 222, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1983). New York admits subsequent repairs
evidence in strict products liability actions based on a manufacturing defect, see Caprara
v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 125-26, 417 N.E.2d 545, 551, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 256-
57 (1981), but excludes such evidence in a design defect action, see Rainbow v. Albert
Elia Bldg. Co., 79 A.D.2d 287, 292-94, 436 N.Y.S.2d 480, 484-85 (1981), aff'd mem., 56
N.Y.2d 550, 434 N.E.2d 1345, 449 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1982).
11. A majority of state courts holds that the rule does not apply to strict products
liability. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 176 (1984); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716 F.2d
1322, 1333 (10th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 2170 (1984); see, e.g., Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 794 (Alaska 1981) (exclusionary policy inapplicable in
strict products liability); Burke v. Illinois Power Co., 57 Ill. App. 3d 498, 514, 373
N.E.2d 1354, 1369 (1978) (post-occurrence changes admissible in strict products liability
action). Many state courts follow the reasoning set forth in the landmark case of Ault v.
International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974):
The contemporary corporate mass producer of goods, the normal products lia-
bility defendant, manufactures tens of thousands of units of goods; it is mani-
festly unrealistic to suggest that such a producer will forego making
improvements in its product, and risk innumerable additional lawsuits and the
attendant adverse effect upon its public image, simply because evidence of adop-
tion of such improvement may be admitted in an action founded on strict liabil-
ity...
. . . [N]ot only is the policy of encouraging repairs and improvements of doubt-
ful validity in an action for strict liability since it is in the economic self interest
of a manufacturer to improve and repair defective products, but. . . the appli-
cation of the rule would be contrary to the public policy of encouraging the
distributor of mass-produced goods to market safer products.
Id. at 120, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816; accord Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 794 (Alaska 1981); Good v. A.B. Chance Co., 39 Colo. App. 70, 78-
79, 565 P.2d 217, 224 (1977); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251, 257 n.7 (S.D.
1976); Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 101-02, 258 N.W.2d 680, 683-84
(1977); Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co., 648 P.2d 519, 523-25 (Wyo. 1982).
Several states hold that the exclusionary policy applies to strict liability. See, e.g., Hall-
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Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins12 established that federal courts may
apply federal procedural law but must apply state substantive law in di-
versity actions.13 Hanna v. Plumer14 dictates that when there is a direct
mark v. Allied Prods. Corp., 132 Ariz. 434, 440-41, 646 P.2d 319, 325-26 (1982); Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 180 Ind. App. 33, 65-66, 388 N.E.2d 541, 561-62
(1979); Smith v. E R Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79, 91-93, 273 N.W.2d 476, 480-81
(1979); Price v. Buckingham Mfg., 110 N.J. Super. 462, 464-65, 266 A.2d 140, 141 (App.
Div. 1970) (per curiam); LaMonica v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 Ohio App. 2d 43, 44-
45, 355 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1976).
12. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13. See id. at 78. The Erie decision was based on interpretation of § 34 of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1982)), commonly referred to as the Rules of Decision Act, which provided:
"[Tihe laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials
at common law in the Courts of the United States in cases where they apply." Id.
In Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), the Supreme Court held that the Rules of
Decision Act referred only to state statutory law; therefore, federal courts were free to
decide what the common law of a state was or should be. See id. at 17-18. Erie held that
the Swift decision rendered impossible equal protection of the laws because it made sub-
stantive rights vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or federal
court. By declaring that federal courts are without power to set state substantive law, the
Court overruled Swift and established the modern interpretation of the Rules of Decision
Act:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of
the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court
in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general
common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a State. . . . And no clause in the Constitution purports to
confer such a power upon the federal courts.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
The Erie doctrine evolved substantially as courts struggled to define the distinction
between substantive and procedural law. However, five decades of Erie interpretation
have failed to provide courts with adequate guidelines. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 468, 471, 473-74 (1965) (conflict between a federal and state rule must be re-
solved in favor of the federal rule; discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of
inequitable administration of the laws are principal concerns); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536-38 (1958) (courts should inquire whether a rule is "merely
a form and mode of enforcing [a right] and not a rule intended to be bound up with the
definition of the rights and obligations of the parties" and should balance federal policy
interests against those of the state) (citations omitted); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99, 109 (1945) ("[W]here a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of
the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court
should be substantially the same. . . as it would be if tried in a State court."); Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) ("The test must be whether a rule really regulates
procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of
them."); P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Fed-
eral Courts and the Federal System 747 (2d ed. 1973) (courts should distinguish "those
rules of law which characteristically and reasonably affect people's conduct at the stage of
primary private activity and should therefore be classified as substantive or quasi-substan-
tive"); Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 725 (1974) (a substan-
tive rule is "a right granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or
purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process").
14. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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conflict between state law and the express language of a federal rule, the
federal rule controls. 5 If there is no direct conflict, however, the court
must look to the policies underlying Erie to determine whether state or
federal law governs. 6 "Discouragement of forum shopping and avoid-
ance of inequitable administration of the laws" are principal concerns."
Nonetheless, federal courts, with few exceptions, routinely ignore the
Erie question and determine, as a matter of federal law, the applicability
of Rule 407 in strict products liability actions. 8 Only two circuits have
15. See iL at 471-74. The Court further stated:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the
court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice: the court
has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if
the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie
judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the En-
abling Act nor constitutional restrictions.
Id. at 471.
Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were promulgated by the Supreme
Court, the Federal Rules of Evidence are not subject to either the Enabling Act or The
Rules of Decision Act because the rules were enacted by Congress. See C. Wright, Law
of Federal Courts § 93, at 621 (4th ed. 1983). Courts are therefore bound only by the
Constitution when deciding whether a Federal Rule of Evidence is valid.
[However,] neither Congress nor the federal courts can, under the guise of for-
mulating rules of decision for federal courts, fashion rules which are not sup-
ported by a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or some other
section of the Constitution; in such areas state law must govern because there
can be no other law.
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72. For an excellent discussion of the constitutional origins of
the Erie doctrine, see C. Wright, supra, § 56, at 359-64.
Hanna is the only Supreme Court case that involved a direct collision between a state
and federal rule. The Court viewed the clash between Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(l), authorizing
substitute service of process, and the state statute requiring in-hand service as "unavoida-
ble [because the federal rule] says-implicitly, but with unmistakable clarity-that in-
hand service is not required in federal courts." Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470. The Court
stated, however, that in measuring a federal rule against the standards in the Enabling
Act and the Constitution, a court "need not wholly blind itself to the degree to which the
Rule makes the character and result of the federal litigation stray from the course it
would follow in state courts." Id at 473 (citation omitted).
16. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980).
17. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. But see infra note 85.
18. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1984); see, e.g., Jo-
sephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 991 (3d Cir. 1982) (Rule 407 applies to strict prod-
ucts liability); Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1980) (Rule 407 does
not apply to strict products liability); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st
Cir. 1978) (Rule 407 applies to strict liability), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
Although most states admit evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict prod-
ucts liability actions, see supra note 11 and accompanying text, the majority of circuit
courts have held that Rule 407 bars such evidence. See, e.g., Flaminio v. Honda Motor
Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984); Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co.,
695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983); Hall v. American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1066-67
(6th Cir. 1982); Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 990-91 (3d Cir. 1982); Cann v.
Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982);
Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 855-57 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080
(1981); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 916 (1979). Even in negligence actions, a conflict between the state and federal rule
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addressed the Erie issue; they have reached different results."9
This Note presents varying methods of Erie analysis that consider both
the social policy and relevance underpinnings of Rule 407 in the strict
products liability context. Part I establishes that Rule 407 does not con-
flict with contrary state products liability law. It then demonstrates that
a strict reading of Hanna dictates the application of state law in order to
discourage forum shopping and inequitable administration of the law.
Part II illustrates that even if Hanna permits a more probing examina-
tion of the Erie question, similar results will obtain. Under one ap-
proach, state interests in the application of its own law simply outweigh
countervailing federal interests. Under a second approach, state law
must control because Rule 407's underlying policy is intended to affect
conduct outside the litigation. This Note concludes that the Erie doc-
trine requires deference to state policy decisions regarding admissibility
of subsequent repairs evidence.
I. THE HANNA CONFLICT TEST
The Hanna conflict test establishes the presumptive validity of federal
rules20 when a federal rule is on point and is within the scope of the
may occur in the First Circuit because Maine admits subsequent repairs evidence. See
supra note 8.
19. In Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 176 (1984), plaintiffs, claiming both negligence and strict products
liability, sought to introduce evidence of subsequent remedial measures, see id. at 920,
923. The Tenth Circuit held exclusion of subsequent remedial measures in a products
liability action to be a matter of state policy:
We hold that when such conflicts arise, because Rule 407 is based primarily on
policy considerations rather than relevancy or truth seeking, the state rule con-
trols because (a) there is no federal products liability law, (b) the elements and
proof of a products liability action are governed by the law of the state where
the injury occurred and these may, and do, for policy reasons, vary from state
to state, and (c) an announced state rule in variance with Rule 407 is so closely
tied to the substantive law to which it relates (product liability) that it must be
applied in a diversity action in order to effect uniformity and to prevent forum
shopping.
Id. at 932.
In Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion. Plaintiffs, in a products liability action, sought to intro-
duce subsequent repairs evidence pursuant to the Wisconsin rule. The Seventh Circuit
barred the evidence under Federal Rule 407. Judge Posner stated:
Although Rule 407 has substantive consequences by virtue of affecting incen-
tives to take safety measures after an accident occurs . . . .Rule 407 is not
based on substantive considerations only. An important though not the pri-
mary reason for the rule was distrust of juries' ability to draw correct inferences
from evidence of subsequent remedial measures. Although it was a mild dis-
trust, as shown by the exceptions built into the rule, it is enough to establish the
rule's constitutionality in diversity cases.
Id. at 471, 472.
20. See Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and its Future, 1 Ga. L. Rev. 563,
574 (1967) ("To borrow a phrase of Professor Degnan's, the implication of Hanna is not
[Vol. 531490
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Federal Rules Enabling Act,21 thereby rendering Erie analysis unneces-
sary. 22 The Court reasoned that Erie is not a constraint on Congres-
sional power to prescribe "housekeeping rules"23 for the federal courts.24
The Hanna formulation, therefore, although simplifying the inquiry for
the courts, 25 has placed with the Rules' drafters a burden to ensure that
federal rules are consonant with Erie principles.26
In enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence Congress was apparently
acutely aware of the Erie problem. 27 Privileges, for example, were con-
sidered a facet of substantive state law.28 Consequently, privileges were
that the federal rules are valid because wise men made them, but because wise men
thought carefully before making them.").
21. See supra note 15.
22. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965); C. Wright, supra note 15, § 59, at
383.
23. "Housekeeping" or procedural rules are "designed to make the process of litiga-
tion a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes." Ely, supra note 13, at
724 (footnotes omitted). Examples include rules of judicial notice, hearsay, qualification
of witnesses, expert and opinion testimony, authentication, and most aspects of relevancy.
Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of
Evidence, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 353, 361-62 (1969).
24. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473 ("Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-
recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even
though some of those rules will inevitably differ from comparable state rules."); see also
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949) (Erie affects how "the
federal court administers the state system of law in all except details related to its own
conduct of business").
25. See C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 59, at 276 (3d ed. 1976); Ely, supra
note 13, at 717; cf Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 748 (1980) (when a
federal rule applies, the sole question is whether the rule is within the scope of the Rules
Enabling Act). Prior to Hanna, the Court, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356
U.S. 525 (1958), sought to establish a more comprehensive analysis, which required in-
quiry into whether a rule is "merely a form and mode of enforcing the [right] and not a
rule intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the
parties." Id. at 536 (citation omitted). Crucial to this analysis was a balancing of federal
policy interests in applying the federal rule with countervailing state interests in the ap-
plication of its own rule. See id. at 537-38. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
The Byrd Court held that the Seventh Amendment established a "strong federal policy"
in favor of jury trials which outweighed the state interests in its contrary rule. See id.
The Byrd approach became cumbersome, however, as federal courts struggled with this
intricate balancing of interests. Ely, supra note 10, at 709.
26. Report of American Bar Association, Special Committee, Federal Rules of Proce-
dure, 38 F.R.D. 95, 102-03 (1965); C. Wright, supra note 15, § 59, at 383; Wright, supra
note 20, at 572; see Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471, 476 (Harlan, J., concurring).
27. See Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing
Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 105-08
(1962); Weinberg, Choice of Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: New Per-
spectives, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 594, 595-602 (1974); Separation of Powers and the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 26 Hast. L.J. 1059, 1060 (1975).
28. See Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555-56 n.2 (2d Cir.
1967); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463,466 (2d Cir. 1962); Palmer
v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1955), cert denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956); 2 D.
Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 1, § 204, at 476; 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note
1, $ 501[01], at 501-13.
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expressly left to determination in accordance with state law.29 Similarly,
rules of competence, 30 presumptions3' and relevance 32 defer to state law
principles. Rule 407, which is not a typical "housekeeping rule,"' 33 also
29. See Fed. R. Evid. 501. The Federal Rules of Evidence, when submitted to Con-
gress, defined nine specific non-constitutional privileges approved by the Supreme Court
and the Advisory Committee, see Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magis-
trates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 234-58 (1973) (deleted rules 502-510), as well as four constitutional
privileges stated in Rule 501, see id. at 230-34. The original text of Rule 501 gave effect
only to these delineated privileges and those enacted by Congress. Id. (deleted rule 501).
Due to the Erie controversy surrounding privileges, Congress finally adopted the follow-
ing text of Rule 501:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect
to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political sub-
division thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Fed. R. Evid. 501.
30. Fed. R. Evid. 601 provides:
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in
these rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an ele-
ment of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law.
31. Fed. R. Evid. 302 provides:
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact
which is an element of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule
of decision is determined in accordance with state law.
32. Fed. R. Evid. 402 provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Con-
stitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evi-
dence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Fed. R. Evid. 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Whether a fact is "of
consequence" is determined by state substantive law. See I J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
supra note 1, 401[03], at 401-16 to -19 (1982); Wellborn, The Federal Rules of Evidence
and the Application of State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 371, 374-75, 392
(1977).
33. Chief Judge Weinstein posits three types of evidence rules. See Weinstein, supra
note 23, at 361-73. The majority of evidence rules are those "designed for all kinds of
litigation and intended to achieve a more effective and truthful result in the litigation
process." Id. at 361. Although rules governing a particular evidentiary judgment may
differ in form, they are intended to achieve the same procedural result. Therefore any
"divergence between state and federal practice is due only to some disagreement about
which will achieve the better result in most cases." ld.
A second category includes those rules that are "intimately connected with special
substantive rules having a strong effect on the substantive-procedural balance in a narrow
class of cases." Id. Whether state or federal rules control under Erie principles "requires
consideration of state policy." Id. at 363. For example, whether a presumption is sub-
stantive or procedural in nature depends on whether it furthers a state policy. Chief
Judge Weinstein illustrates the proper Erie analysis:
[I]n insurance cases where there is a presumption against suicide, shifting the
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encroaches on state substantive law.34 Indeed, its strong social policy
underpinnings are often considered its primary justification."
Because the elements of various strict products liability claims closely
resemble those of negligence, however, such claims may fall within the
literal scope of Rule 407. Although this gives rise to an apparent conflict
between state law and the federal rule, the breadth of Rule 407 may only
be determined by reference to its underlying policies as they relate to
strict products liability. The divergent approaches among the states re-
garding the treatment of strict products liability claims, however, under-
scores the complexity of this issue. Resolution of the scope question
would invariably require federal courts to intrude into those predomi-
nantly state social policy decisions. In light of Congressional concerns
with Erie principles, it is unlikely that the drafters intended such an in-
trusion.36 Inclusion of Rule 407 among the federal rules can perhaps
best be explained as the codification of a universally recognized common
law principle37 that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is inadmis-
burden of proof provides the equivalent of a substantive rule. But a presump-
tion such as that establishing the receipt of a mailed letter is so generally applied
and so clearly a rule of convenience that it can be treated as a rule of procedure.
Classification requires an analysis of the reason giving rise to the presumption.
Id. at 364 (footnotes omitted).
The final class of rules includes those "designed to achieve independent substantive
impact, regardless of the class of case in which they appear." Id. at 361. Because these
rules promote extrinsic substantive policies in all cases, the state rule normally controls
under Erie. Privileges fall into this category. Id. at 370.
Although Rule 407 arguably falls within the third category, see 2 D. Louisell & C.
Mueller, supra note 1, § 166, at 259 n.8; Weinstein, supra note 23, at 370, it is more
consistent with the second because the rule is not designed solely to further an extrinsic
policy; it also has a procedural basis. Rule 407's substantive-procedural complexion is
therefore dependent on whether it is applied for relevance or social policy reasons.
34. See supra notes 19, 33, infra note 87.
35. See supra notes 2, 5, 6 and accompanying text.
36. See Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 933 (10th
Cir.) (quoting 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 1, § 166, at 264), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 176 (1984); see also 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, at 407-I ("Congress
made no change in Rule 407, and it was neither the subject of floor debate, nor the subject
of discussion during the course of committee hearings on the Rules in the House of Rep-
resentatives.").
Apparently, the Special Subcommittee simply disregarded the following communica-
tion from Professor Victor Schwartz:
"[R]ule 407 excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures when offered to
prove negligence or culpable conduct. As the Advisory Committee notes, the
rule is not based on relevance, but on the goal of encouraging (or at least not
discouraging) defendants from making repairs after an accident has occurred
.I... [W]hether the evidence is excluded or not should be a matter of state
policy where state law governs .... A similar situation would exist with any
rule whose purpose is not finding truth or expediting a trial, but rather promot-
ing some other value and excluding evidence on that basis."
2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, at 407-2 (ellipses in original) (quoting Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Rules of
Evidence (Supp.), H.R. Ser. No. 2, 93d Cong., Ist. Sess. 303 (1973).
37. See Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716 F.2d 1322, 1327 (10th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2170 (1984); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir.
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sible to prove negligence. In the absence of a common law application to
strict products liability, Rule 407 should be construed to avoid a conflict
with state law. All states have strict products liability rules that coexist
with parallels to Rule 407.38
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.," despite the literal language of the
rule at issue, the Court construed the federal rule governing commence-
ment of actions as not conflicting with state law due to the absence of the
drafters' intention to affect state statutes of limitations. 40 The Court clar-
ified the proper method of Erie analysis when a federal rule is at issue. A
court must ascertain the scope of the federal rule.4 ' If the rule is not
sufficiently broad to cover the issue in dispute, the court can apply fed-
eral law only if to do so is consistent with Erie principles.4 2 Recently,
several states have enacted detailed products liability statutes that in-
clude sections on admissibility of evidence.43 Other states have amended
their subsequent remedial measures rules to expressly exempt or include
products liability cases.' Several others use language identical to that in
Rule 407 but have amended. the advisory comments to indicate whether
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. American Cyanamid
Co., 321 F.2d 683, 690 (5th Cir. 1963); 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 1, § 163, at
235 & n.36.
38. See supra notes 7-8, infra notes 43-45.
39. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
40. Id. at 750-51.
41. Id. at 749-50.
42. See id. at 750-53.
43. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-686 (1982) (subsequent remedial measures
inadmissible as evidence of a defect in products liability action); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-
404 (Supp. 1984) (evidence of scientific advancements discovered after sale of product by
manufacturer inadmissible except to show duty to warn); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 600.2946 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (subsequent remedial measures inadmissible; evi-
dence of conformity with state of the art, laws or regulations admissible); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 27-407 (Supp. 1978) (subsequent remedial measures inadmissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct which includes manufacture or sale of defective product).
The Model Uniform Product Liability Act contains the following provision:
Evidence of changes in (1) a product's design, (2) warnings or instructions con-
cerning the product, (3) technological feasibility, (4) "state of the art", or (5)
the custom of the product seller's industry or business, occurring after the prod-
uct was manufactured, is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the
product was defective in design under Subsection 104(B) or that a warning or
instruction should have accompanied the product at the time of manufacture
under Subsection 104(C).
If the court finds that the probative value of such evidence substantially out-
weighs its prejudicial effect and that there is no other proof available, this evi-
dence may be admitted for other relevant purposes if confined to those purposes
in a specific court instruction. Examples of "other relevant purposes" include
proving ownership or control, or impeachment.
Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 107(A) (1979).
44. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-407 (1978) (exclusionary rule applies in products
liability action); Alaska R. Evid. 407 (subsequent remedial measures evidence admissible
in products liability action); Hawaii R. Evid. 407 (same); Tex. R. Evid. 407 (same).
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the rule is to apply in such actions.45 These legislative policy determina-
tions evince a clear intent to admit or exclude subsequent remedial meas-
ures evidence in products liability actions. With no indication that the
drafters of Rule 407 intended to affect strict products liability claims,46
Rule 407 is simply not broad enough to encompass the strict liability
issue. A federal court must therefore look to the policies underlying Erie
to determine whether state law applies.4 7
The Hanna decision seems to reduce this inquiry to consideration of
"the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws."' 48  Subsequent re-
medial measures evidence can be extremely damaging to a defendant's
case.49 Plaintiffs are therefore likely to choose the forum more favorable
to admission while defendants will seek a forum that will exclude such
evidence. Consequently, when federal and state courts differ regarding
the admissibility of subsequent repairs evidence in strict liability suits,
forum shopping concerns and avoidance of inequitable administration of
the law dictate the application of state law.50
II. ALTERNATIVE MODES OF ERIE ANALYSIS
A. Balancing State and Federal Interests
Some courts have read Hanna to permit a more comprehensive Erie
analysis when a federal rule and state law are not in direct conflict. 5'
These courts often rely on the pre-Hanna formula established by the
Supreme Court in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,52 which
requires that state interests be weighed against countervailing federal in-
45. See, eg., Mich. R. Evid. 407 committee note (exclusionary rule applies); Wyo. R.
Evid. 407 committee note (subsequent remedial measures evidence admissible).
46. Cf Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-51 (1980) (state rule for
commencement of actions controls because no indication that federal rule was ever in-
tended to affect statutes of limitations). See supra notes 27-32, 34, 36-37 and accompany-
ing text.
47. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980).
48. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (footnote omitted).
49. Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S.
960 (1982); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir.
1980); see Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 134-35, 417 N.E.2d 545, 555-56,
436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 262 (1981) (Jasen, Jones, Meyer, JJ., dissenting) (subsequent design
changes will in almost all cases determine the result in strict liability actions).
50. Note, Rule 408 and Erie: The Latent Conflict, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 275, 293-94 (1978)
("A choice of forum motivated by the desire to exclude specific, detrimental evidence is,
however, a choice of the sort condemned by Erie, a deliberate effort to circumvent the
policies of the state.") [hereinafter cited as Rule 408 and Erie]. See infra note 85.
51. See, eg., In re Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 550
F.2d 1320, 1325 (2d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 314 (6th Cir. 1974); Szan-
tay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 63-64 (4th Cir. 1965).
52. 356 U.S. 525 (1958); see C. Wright, supra note 15, § 59, at 386 ('Byrd v. Blue
Ridge has not been overruled, nor its interest-balancing technique repudiated, and, when
faced with the typical relatively unguided Erie choice, its approach has been found use-
ful.") (footnote omitted).
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terests which must themselves be balanced against the likelihood that
application of federal law will be outcome determinative. 3
As previously discussed, Rule 407 embodies a policy decision to en-
courage post-accident repairs. 4 State courts that bar subsequent repairs
evidence in strict products liability actions reason that the policy behind
the rule applies regardless of whether a claim is premised on negligence
or strict liability." Courts that admit the evidence consider the policy to
be of doubtful validity in strict products liability because the modem
mass producer will not forego making repairs at the risk of incurring
substantial future liability. 6 In addition, these courts reason that the
focus in strict products liability is often on the product rather than on the
defendant's conduct.5
7
Whether the policy underlying Rule 407 is applicable in strict products
liability is a judgment best reserved to the states.5 Although there are
other social policy-oriented federal evidence rules, those rules promote
particular federal interests.5 9 For example, Rule 408 excludes evidence
of offers to compromise. This rule furthers the federal policy of promot-
ing offers to compromise' in order to reduce the workload of the federal
53. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536-38.
54. See supra note 2.
55. See, e.g., Hallmark v. Allied Products, 132 Ariz. 434, 440-41, 646 P.2d 319, 325-
26 (1982); Smith v. E R Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79, 91-93, 273 N.W.2d 476, 480-
81(1979).
56. See, ag., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 793-94 (Alaska 1981);
Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 120, 528 P.2d 1148, 1152, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812, 816 (1974) (en banc); Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 101-02,
258 N.W.2d 680, 683-84 (1977); Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co., 648 P.2d 519, 523-25
(Wyo. 1982). See supra note 11.
57. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 794 (Alaska 1981);
Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 319, 281 N.E.2d 749, 753
(1972); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251, 257 n.7 (S.D. 1976).
58. See 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, 1 407[03], at 407-15. ("In diversity
cases, Erie concerns should require that [products liability] statutes be given effect be-
cause of their largely substantive content."). But see Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733
F.2d 463, 472 (7th Cir. 1984) ("We are reluctant to cast a cloud over the whole federal
rulemaking enterprise and ... [hold] that a procedural rule is beyond even the power of
Congress to enact ... because the rule affects substantive questions that the Erie doc-
trine reserves to the states.").
59. Fed. R. Evid. 408 provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) ac-
cepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compro-
mising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either
validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the
claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion
of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the
course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion
when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or preju-
dice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
60. The Advisory Committee notes state that the rule resembles Rule 407 because
exclusion may be based on two grounds: "(1) The evidence is irrelevant, since the offer
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courts.6 ' No equivalent federal policy supports Rule 407;62 rather the
rule is a codification of state tort law policy. 3 Moreover, unlike Rule
408, the social policy rationale, as opposed to the relevance ground, un-
derlying Rule 407 has been recognized as the "controlling" ground for
exclusion of subsequent remedial measures evidence by the courts.' Ac-
cordingly, state interests in assessing the effectiveness of Rule 407's ex-
clusionary policy in strict liability actions far exceed any federal interests
in making such determinations.6" The state interests therefore must
govern.
In addition to the social policy justifications, however, Rule 407 is
designed to exclude evidence of low probative value.66 Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 allows exclusion of evidence that the court determines to
be substantially more confusing to the jury than probative.6 7 Rule 407
reflects the drafters' determination that a Rule 403 balance should al-
ways be struck in favor of excluding subsequent remedial measures evi-
dence in actions involving negligence or culpable conduct.6" The
may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of
position. . .(2) A more consistently impressive ground is promotion of the public policy
favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes." Fed. R. Evid. 408 advisory com-
mittee note.
61. Weinstein, supra note 23, at 370 n.75; Rule 408 and Erie, supra note 50, at 290.
62. 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, 407[02], at 407-12.
63. See supra notes 7, 11, 19, 37.
64. 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, 407[02], at 407-9 & n.5. See supra
note 2.
65. Federal courts often decide this question as a matter of federal law. See. eg.,
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468-70 (7th Cir. 1984) (exclusionary policy
applies to strict products liability); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716 F.2d 1322,
1331 (10th Cir. 1983) (subsequent remedial measures admissible in strict products liabil-
ity primarily because of exclusionary policy), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 2170 (1984);
DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1983) (exclusionary
policy applies to strict liability action based on manufacturer's failure to warn due to
strong similarity to negligence); Hall v. American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1067 (6th Cir.
1982) (exclusionary policy applies to strict liability); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d
54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 855-58 (4th Cir. 1980)
(same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
66. See Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887 (5th Cir.
1983); Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 118-19, 528 P.2d 1148, 1151,
117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (1975) (en banc); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 180
Ind. App. 33, 65, 388 N.E.2d 541, 561 (1979); Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee
note. See supra notes 6, 43, infra note 69.
67. Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or need-
less presentation of cumulative evidence.
68. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee note (the rules in Art. IV of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which include Rule 407, are "concrete applications evolved for partic-
ular situations" of Rule 403's balancing of probative value against prejudice); 23 C.
Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5282, at 91 (1980) (advisory
committee suggests that federal relevance rules are concrete applications of the balancing
required under Rules 401 and 403); cf. Columbia & P.S.RR. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S.
202, 207 (1892) ("the evidence. . . has no legitimate tendency to prove that the defend-
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principal rationale is that a defendant's subsequent repairs are simply a
normal response to an accident and therefore not necessarily indicative of
negligent conduct.69
Whether this relevance rationale applies in strict products liability ac-
tions is unclear. In a claim alleging defective design, for example, evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures may be highly probative because
it is unlikely that a manufacturer would incur the cost of altering a prod-
uct's design unless it was defective.70 The danger of jury confusion
would be minimal. When the strict products liability claim is that the
manufacturer failed to warn of a defect, however, the necessary inquiry is
so closely related to that in a negligence action 71 that use of Rule 407's
procedural balance is appropriate to enhance accurate fact-finding. A
ant had been negligent before the accident happened, and is calculated to distract the
minds of the jury from the real issue, and to create a prejudice against the defendant");
Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1975) (subsequent remedial measures
excluded in failure to warn case because proponents could not point to countervailing
probative value to offset prejudice); Model Unif. Prod. Liab. Act § 107(A) (1979) (court
can admit evidence of subsequent repairs only if the probative value outweighs its preju-
dicial effect and no other proof is available); N.Y. Proposed Code of Evid. § 407 com-
ment (evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not probative of wrongful conduct
and can therefore be highly prejudicial). But see Wellborn, supra note 32, at 394 (Rule
407 is an exclusionary rule of different nature than Rule 403, which does not promote
extrinsic policy).
69. See Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee note ("The conduct is not in fact an
admission. . . . [The rule rejects the notion that 'because the world gets wiser as it gets
older, therefore it was foolish before.' ") (quoting Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry.
Co., 21 L.T.R. (n.s.) 261, 263 (1869)); 2 J. Wigmore, supra note I, § 283, at 174-75 ("To
improve the condition of the injury-causing object is therefore to indicate a belief merely
that it has been capable of causing such an injury, but indicates nothing more . . ."
(emphasis in original).
70. See R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modem Approach to Evidence 194 (2d ed.
1982). To prove a design defect, a plaintiff must normally show that an alternative design
was both safer and feasible. Subsequent remedial measures are highly probative because
"a business is not likely to change a product unless the change promotes safety and is
feasible." Id. But see Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887-
88 (5th Cir. 1983) (Although cost may be a consideration, design changes may be made
after an accident "simply to avoid another injury, as a sort of admission of error, because
a better way has been discovered, or to implement an idea or plan conceived before the
accident.").
71. [In a failure to warn case] a claimant. . . must, according to the generally
accepted view, prove that the manufacturer-designer was negligent. There will
be no liability without a showing that the defendant designer knew or should
have known in the exercise of ordinary care of the risk or hazard about which
he failed to warn. Moreover, there will be no liability unless manufacturer
failed to take the precautions that a reasonable person would take in presenting
the product to the public. Although this ground of recovery is sometimes re-
ferred to as strict liability, it is really nothing more than a ground of negligence
liability. ...
Prosser & Keeton, supra note 10, § 99, at 697; see DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories,
Inc., 697 F.2d 222, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1983) (language in strict liability and negligence
instructions nearly identical in failure to warn cases; issues of due care and forseeability
inherent considerations in both theories); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th
Cir. 1980) (minimal distinction between negligence and strict liability, especially in fail-
ure to warn cases), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
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federal court may, therefore, have an interest in excluding subsequent
repairs evidence on Rule 407's relevance grounds.7 2 This interest must
be considered in light of countervailing state interests in admitting such
evidence.73 Several states have decided that admission is appropriate
only because exclusion does not effectively achieve its policy goals.7' Ex-
clusion therefore hinders no state desired social policy. Nonetheless, fed-
eral interests in applying Rule 407 for its relevance rationale are minimal
because Rules 4027' and 40376 provide alternative procedural means by
which the court may keep irrelevant or misleading evidence from the
jury.
The defective design example is illustrative. When a design change is
the result of technology developed after the manufacture of the product
at issue, evidence of the design change may be excluded either because it
is substantially more confusing to the jury than it is relevant under Rule
403 77 or because it is irrelevant under Rule 402.78 Similar arguments can
be made for actions alleging defective manufacture. Often in these cases
the only issue is whether the product itself, and not the manufacturing
process or the product's design, is defective.79 Under these circum-
72. See, eg., Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 887 (5th
Cir. 1983); Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1975); cf Columbia &
P.S.R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892) (common law applied).
73. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. In New York, however, the decision to
admit evidence of subsequent repairs in strict products liability actions is designed in part
to lessen the plaintiff's burden of proof. See Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114,
123-25, 417 N.E.2d 545, 549-50, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251,255-56 (1981). In Caprara, the court
reasoned that because strict liability developed to ease consumers' problems of proof, the
evidence should be admitted if a reasonable person could find any probative value. See id.
at 123-26, 417 N.E.2d at 549-51, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 255-57. The court further explained
that in strict liability the scienter requirement has been removed in order to impose a
heavy burden of cost and responsibility on the manufacturer, who is in the best position
to eliminate the danger. See id. at 123, 417 N.E.2d at 549-50, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
Because burden of proof is typically a question governed by state law, see Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 210-12
(1939); Federal Ins. Co. v. Areias, 680 F.2d 962, 964 (3d Cir. 1982), the state interest in
admitting subsequent repairs evidence in these circumstances is somewhat stronger than
in the usual case.
75. See supra note 32.
76. See Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1981). See supra note 67
and accompanying text.
77. See R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, supra note 70, at 194 n.13. See supra note 6.
78. See Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 79 A.D.2d 287, 294,436 N.Y.S.2d 480, 485
(1981) (in design defect case, inquiry should be limited to technology existing at time of
manufacture), affid mer., 56 N.Y.2d 550, 434 N.E.2d 1345, 449 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1982);
Prosser & Keeton, supra note 10, § 99, at 701 ("It is generally agreed that a product
cannot be regarded as defectively designed. . . because after the sale. . . there was a
technological breakthrough .... [T]he courts have almost universally held that the fea-
sibility of designing a safer product must be determined as of the time the product was
designed."); cf. Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530, 540 (N.D. 1977) (focus
is on product in all strict products liability actions, and therefore probative value of state-
of-the-art evidence is negligible).
79. Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 123, 417 N.E.2d 545, 549, 436
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stances, evidence of subsequent remedial measures is irrelevant under
Rule 402. Reliance on Rule 407's procedural rationale is thus
unnecessary.
Federal interests in applying Rule 407's relevance rationale are further
diminished when balanced against the final factor in the Byrd test-the
likelihood that applying federal law will be outcome determinative. 80
Outcome determination, redefined in Hanna as discouragement of forum
shopping," heavily favors applying state law.8" Accordingly, even
Byrd's sophisticated balancing approach dictates that state law control
the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures evidence in strict
products liability actions.
B. Harlan's "Primary Private Activity" Approach
Assuming that Hanna permits more than consideration of forum shop-
ping and equitable administration of the laws when there is no direct
conflict between state law and a federal rule, 3 Justice Harlan's often-
cited concurring opinion in Hanna presents an Erie formulation that
merits attention.84 Harlan believed that the proper mode of Erie analysis
requires a court to inquire whether a rule would "substantially affect
those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our constitu-
tional system leaves to state regulation." '85 Because the social policy un-
N.Y.S.2d 251, 255 (1981); Halloran v. Virginia Chems. Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 386, 388, 361
N.E.2d 991, 993, 393 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (1977); see Prosser & Keeton, supra note 10,
§ 99, at 695 ("[A] flaw in a product is defined as an abnormality or a condition that was
unintended, and makes the product more dangerous than it would have been as in-
tended."). See supra note 10.
80. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1958). See supra
note 49.
81. 'Outcome-determination' analysis was never intended to serve as a talis-
man .... [C]hoices between state and federal law are to be made not by appli-
cation of any automatic, 'litmus paper' criterion, but rather by reference to the
policies underlying the Erie rule .... The 'outcome-determination' test there-
fore cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discour-
agement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1965) (footnotes and citations omitted).
82. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
84. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-78 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 475. Justice Harlan further stated that the majority's interpretation of Erie
overemphasized the role of forum shopping and understated the importance of federal-
ism-of the allocation of judicial power between state and federal systems:
Erie recognized that there should not be two conflicting systems of law control-
ling the primary activity of citizens, for such alternative governing authority
must necessarily give rise to a debilitating uncertainty in the planning of every-
day affairs. . . . Thus, in diversity cases Erie commands that it be the state law
governing primary private activity which prevails.
Id. at 474-75 (footnote omitted); cf Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 387 & n.23 (1964) ("the tendency of the law must
always be to narrow the field of uncertainty" that the Swift v. Tyson decision created)
(quoting 0. Holmes, The Common Law 127 (1881)).
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derlying Rule 407 is intended to affect conduct outside the litigation, 6
Harlan's "primary private activity" test also leaves to the state the assess-
ment of whether the rule effectively achieves its social policy in strict
products liability actions.87 Moreover, Harlan's interpretation of Erie
cannot be read without reference to Hanna's strongly expressed forum
shopping concerns.88 Consequently, even when a federal court seeks to
exclude evidence on Rule 407's relevance grounds, state law must
control.
CONCLUSION
Because there is no indication that the drafters of Rule 407 intended to
encroach on issues of state tort law policy, the rule does not automat-
ically control in federal diversity actions based on strict products liabil-
ity. Rather, it can be applied only when consistent with Erie principles.
Hanna v. Plumer's emphasis on discouraging forum shopping seems to
require that state law govern in such actions. Closer consideration of the
Erie question also yields this conclusion. State social policy interests in
applying state law supersede countervailing federal interests in applying
Rule 407 on relevance grounds because other evidence rules adequately
safeguard these interests. Moreover, dangers of forum shopping mini-
mize whatever federal interests may exist.
Harlan's "primary private activity" test also dictates that state law
control insofar as the policy underlying Rule 407 is intended to affect
conduct outside the litigation. Consequently, all methods of Erie analy-
sis command federal courts to follow state law when deciding whether
86. Some commentators question whether Rule 407 actually affects conduct outside
the litigation because it is unlikely that the ordinary defendant is aware of the rule. See 2
D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 1, § 164, at 240; 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra
note 1, 407[02], at 407-10. The exclusionary rule, however, seems to have such an effect
in products liability. Several insurance companies advise their clients not to undertake
any subsequent repairs until accident litigation is concluded. Report of the Comm. of
Dep't of Justice 9-10 (1970), cited in 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 1, § 164, at
240 n.55 and in 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, 407[01], at 407-6 n.10.
Furthermore, large manufacturers, who are defendants in hundreds or thousands of
products liability suits, are the ones most likely to know about the rule and be influenced
by it. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1984).
87. Where a Federal Rule has little to do with fact ascertainment, and serves
instead a wholly extrinsic policy not closely connected with the proper exercise
of some federal power. . . then it is highly doubtful that the Rule may be
viewed as consistent with the Erie doctrine if applied in cases where state law
supplies the rule of decision. Where Evidence law excludes certain kinds of
proof because of such extrinsic policy concerns, there is good reason to consider
such law to be part of the fabric of the substantive law, and to treat it as sub-
stantive for Erie purposes.
2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 1, § 166, at 260.
88. See supra note 17.
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subsequent remedial measures evidence is admissible in strict products
liability actions.
Andrea Lynne Flink
